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Abstract
This paper challenges the commonly held view that the Classical Greek potential opta-
tive has a subjective epistemic semantics, the result of a conceptual confusion of sub-
jectivity and epistemicmodality inherited from our standard grammars. I propose that
this view becomes less convincing when the optative’s unique interaction with the
subjective particles ἦ and ἄρα is incorporated into the analysis. Rather, the potential
optative has a non-subjective epistemic semantics presenting an epistemic judgment
as interpersonally accessible to the conversational participants. Frequencies of com-
bination with ἦ and ἄρα, linguistic tests for subjectivity on the potential optative, and
contrastive contextual analyses corroborate this view.
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1 Introduction
Currently, the domain of Ancient Greek particles persists as a favoured object
of research among Ancient Greek linguists, leading to a steady decrease in the
number of unanswered questions that the particles raise.1 Nevertheless, a ques-
tion that inmy view has been somewhat left unexploredwith regard to the par-
ticles is how they interact with other linguistic domains such as tense, aspect,
1 Cf., for example, Bonifazi et al. (2016).
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modality and mood.2 This lack may be due to the influence of Denniston’s
seminal work (especially for modality and mood); for despite his maximalist
description of the particle’s uses, he did not distinguish among different uses
with mood types or among specific uses of moods. Recently, two fundamen-
tal improvements to Denniston’s approach have been suggested: Thijs (2017)
has convincingly argued that a distinction between uses in non-assertive and
assertive speech acts is relevant for the functional description of the Ancient
Greek particle μήν, and Revuelta Puigdollers (2017: 24) has suggested that par-
ticles “mark or modify both the illocutionary force and the modality expressed
by the clause.” He also summarized the compatibility of particles with specific
sentence types. This paper proposes to take these ideas one step further by
arguing that theway that certainparticles combinewith specificmooduses can
tell usmore about thatmooduse.More specifically, this paperwill highlight the
unique contribution of the two subjective particles ἦ and ἄρα to the identifica-
tion of the semantics of the potential optative in Classical Greek.3 I chose these
particles because of their remarkable distribution with the potential optative.4
Currently, the difference in meaning of the potential optative when it is and
when it is not combined with subjective particles such as ἦ (and ἄρα) is still to
be explained; see example (1):
(1) Orestes:
ἐλθὼν
come.PTCP.AOR.NOM.SG
δὲ
PTC
δὴ
PTC
πῶς
how.Q
φονέας
murderers.ACC.PL
ἂν
PTC
κτάνοι
kill.OPT.AOR.3SG
πατρός;
father.GEN.SG
2 To illustrate, no article in the collections of Rijksbaron (1997) or Logozzo & Poccetti (2018)
discusses the interaction of these domains. However, recent attempts to investigate the inter-
action of particles withmood/modality are Revuelta Puigdollers (2017) andTronci (2017). See
Allan (2009; 2013b) for the relevance of particles in distinguishing different text types and
modes of narration. Finally, Denizot (2011: 82–86) briefly discusses particles that are suscep-
tible to occurring with directives, but she does not perform an in-depth assessment of their
influence on the meaning of the co-occurring mood.
3 Throughout I use the term ‘potential optative’ to refer to an optative mood form in a main
clause (most often combined with the particle ἄν) that receives an interpretation of poten-
tiality.
4 Another reason is that the potential optative has been systematically disregarded by Dennis-
ton (1954). He only discusses wishes separately, treating potential optatives under the same
headers as indicatives. Furthermore, the wish optative also occurs with both particles, sug-
gesting that it has a similar non-subjective epistemic meaning, but this matter lies outside
the scope of this article and is discussed in la Roi forthc.
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Electra:
τολμῶν
dare.PTCP.PRS.NOM.SG
ὑπ’
by
ἐχθρῶν
enemies.GEN.PL
οἷ’
what
ἐτολμήθη
endure.AOR.3SG
†πατήρ†.
father.NOM.SG
Orestes:
ἦ
PTC
καὶ
also
μετ’
with
αὐτοῦ
he.GEN.SG
μητέρ’
mother.ACC.SG
ἂν
PTC
τλαίης
dare.OPT.AOR.2SG
κτανεῖν;
kill.INF
Electra:
ταὐτῶι
the.same.DAT.SG
γε
PTC
πελέκει
axe.DAT.SG
τῶι
the.DAT
πατὴρ
father.NOM.SG
ἀπώλετο.
die.3SG.AOR
Orestes: But if he does come, howwould he kill his father’s murderers?
Electra: By showing the same boldness his enemies once showed.
Orestes: Surely you would also have the hardihood to kill your mother
with his help?
Electra: Yes, with the same axe with which my father met his death!5
(E. El. 274–277)
The particles ἦ and ἄρα have been, I think, convincingly classified as markers
of subjective semantic meaning by Allan (2015) using the elaborate, hierarchi-
cally layered organization of the clause from Functional Discourse Grammar.6
Consequently, these particles can tell us something about the semantics of the
moodswithwhich they occur. However, the semantics of the potential optative
has been commonly characterized as subjective, as well (e.g., Drummen 2013:
74). An alternative explanation would thus be desirable.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to outlining a non-subjective ap-
proach to the semantics of the potential optative to offer such a potential
explanation. As I emphasize further on as well, my proposal thus only con-
cerns the semantics of the potential optative, not the many pragmatic values
of utterances with the potential optative. After examining the previous litera-
5 I used the most recent OCT-editions for the texts in this article. My translations are based on
the most recent Loeb translations.
6 For Functional Discourse Grammar, see Hengeveld&Mackenzie (2008), and for a diachronic
version Allan (2018).
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ture on the potential optative and the particles foundwith it (Section 2), I detail
a non-subjective approach to epistemicmodality (Section 3), and the potential
optative in particular (Section 4), which can account for the combinationswith
these particles as well. Subsequently, I present three types of support for this
approach: (1) the low frequency of the potential optative combining with the
subjective particles ἦ and ἄρα (Section 5); (2) linguistic tests for subjectivity on
the potential optative (Section 6); and (3) contextual analysis of the potential
optativewith ἦ and ἄρα andwithout them (Sections 7 and 8). Section 9presents
the conclusions and avenues for further research.
2 Previous literature on the potential optative and particles
There are quite a fewmethodological dangers in using our standard grammars
for the synchronic linguistic analysis of moods. Most analyses in these gram-
mars propose a general characterization of the potential optative’s value that
covers an enormous diachronic period of Greek. For example, Kühner-Gerth’s
characterization of the potential optative is intended to hold for Homeric
Greek, Classical Greek and post-classical Greek, apart from some changes that
are discussed.7 To account for differences in value, these grammars list uses.
Although these uses provide insights into the pragmatic functions of utter-
ances with the potential optative, they obscure the relationship between the
semantics and the pragmatics of the potential optative itself. Such uses do
not specify which semantic meaning as opposed to pragmatic meaning the
optative mood form codes as potential optative.8 Needless to say, not observ-
ing the (later) distinction between semantics and pragmatics is not something
that can really be held against traditional grammars such as Kühner-Gerth’s,
but we should be duly aware of their different approach. Another drawback
of these grammars is that they still thought of modality and mood as funda-
mentally subjective categories,9 a view which has been retained until now.10
7 Also, Kühner & Gerth (1904: 231) and Goodwin (1867: 291) treat post-Homeric poetry and
Homer under the sameheader as poetry, as opposed to prose, thus generalizing over genre
instead of diachronically different types of Greek.
8 The description inspired by Functional Grammar by Revuelta Puigdollers (2005) offers a
promising start, as it more systematically separates semantic from pragmatic values with
the moods.
9 E.g. Kühner & Gerth (1904: 201). Schwyzer & Debrunner (1950: 303) are slightly more
nuanced.
10 See the EAGLL chapter onMood andModality by Ruiz Yamuza (2014: 456), who contends
that any expression of modality seems to be subjective. A different but related approach is
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This paper, however, will follow recent general linguistic studies that have fal-
sified this assumption.11
As for particles, the grammars have so far only dealt with explaining the
problematic distribution of the particle ἄν with the potential optative. Al-
though there are Classical Greek potential optatives without ἄν in metrically
and non-metrically conditioned texts,12 Kühner & Gerth claim that in Attic, ἄν
is as a rule rightly added to texts by editors when amain clause optative with a
potentialmeaning lacks ἄν. Still, we know that non-Attic Greek did not observe
this rule (Slotty 1915: 83–84), leaving the precise function of ἄν controversial.13
Recently, Zingg (2017) has argued that ἄν was added to the future in Classical
Greek,14which inmyviewmakes itworth considering that theparticle hasmul-
tiple functions dependent on the mood it occurs with.15 After all, ἄν is said to
be obligatorywith the counterfactual indicative in themain clause (Rijksbaron
2006: 7)whereas it is not fully obligatorywith thepotential optative in themain
clause, pointing to a difference in status for both combinations.
More recently, Ruiz Yamuza (2000) has attempted to describe the combina-
tion of the subjective adverbs τάχα and ἴσως with the Classical Greek moods
(including the optative) within a Functional Grammar framework. While I
share her view that the adverbs can occur with both subjective modalities and
objectivemodalities, I have several objections to theway she develops her argu-
ment. First of all, in her sketch of the Classical Greek mood system she claims
that the potential optative expresses both possibility and probability, instead
of possibility only (Ruiz Yamuza 2000: 238) as is more generally accepted (Cre-
spo 1992: 296–299; Allan 2013a: 31). This classification confusingly aligns the
potential optative with the future indicative, which is, in its use for predic-
Allan (2013a: 10), who interprets theAncientGreekmoods as so-called grounding predica-
tions, speaker-oriented modal expressions that locate state affairs relative to the speaker
and hearer and their spheres of knowledge.
11 Especially Narrog (2012: 13–45). He critically discusses almost all takes on subjectivity that
have been implemented in linguistics and why it should be kept separate from modality
and mood.
12 Oddly enough, Kühner & Gerth (1904: 225, 231) suggest a difference in meaning for the
potential without versus with ἄν.
13 E.g., Smyth (1920: 398), who states: “ἄν limits the meaning of the moods”. Others suggest
that ἄν potentializes the optative, such as Goodwin (1867: 77–78) and Kühner & Gerth
(1904: 245), or that it is a stylistic feature (Bers 1984: 117–142).
14 Cf. Crespo (1984), who showed how editors have, in a structural fashion, removed ἄν from
its occurrence with the infinitive even after verbs of saying and thinking.
15 Perhaps the different functions all in some way relate to the more general characteriza-
tions that have been offered in the literature to cover all its uses, e.g., Gerö (2000) or Allan
(2015).
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tions, epistemically subjective in nature and different in use (Allan 2017b: 53).
Secondly, she argues—wrongly, in my view—that every combination of “these
modality adverbs and the optativemood, future tense or the subjunctivemood
are harmonic combinations, since both the adverbs and these moods express
the same grade of factuality: either probability or possibility” (Ruiz Yamuza
2000: 242; also 2014: 457). Harmonic combinations of epistemic judgments can,
however, only be the case when the twomodal elements share the samemodal
strength (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 174; Lyons 1977: 807). As I argue later
in this paper, the potential optative is non-harmonic with subjective markers
because it has a different modal strength as non-subjective modality. Thirdly,
she applied tests that had been used in Functional Grammar at the time to
distinguish between subjective and objective modality types, but those tests
have since been abandoned.16 Naturally, she cannot be blamed for this, but it
does bear on the validity of her findings, as, for example, alleged oddities in
behaviour are not, in fact, oddities.17
After her, Denizot (2011) has shown how a speech-act-theoretic approach
provides insights for the description of the pragmatic functions of moods
(including the optative). Nevertheless, due to her focus on the pragmatic side
of moods, I do not agree with her semantic characterization of the potential
optative, that is, as an instance of so-called alethicmodality (Denizot 2011: 409–
419). The category of alethic modality originated from modal logic and is used
to refer towhat ismarked as logically true in theworld. She took this fromwhat
seems tome a quite outdated tripartition of themodal domain in alethic, deon-
tic and epistemic modality (Denizot 2011: 31, from Gardes-Tamine 1987). First
of all, epistemic modality is defined there as inherently subjective, a position
that I argue against in Section 3. Second, it had already been suggested that the
notion of alethicmodality creates a false linguistic distinction since “there is no
distinction between (…)what is logically true andwhat the speaker believes, as
amatter of fact, to be true” (Palmer 1986: 11).18 Third, I think that alethicmodal-
ity should only be considered as a label if there are many strong arguments to
support it, because alethicmodality is rarely grammatically coded (Narrog 2012:
6), and because in linguistic analysis the notion is “hardly ever used” (Nuyts
2006: 9).
The most recent proposal for the potential optative in Classical Greek has
beenDrummen (2013),whoadoptedaConstructionGrammarapproach topin-
16 Cf. Narrog (2012: 13–45).
17 For example, she gives an instance of ἴσως in focus to show that it does not meet an older
requirement from Functional Grammar of focus status for higher layer operators, but this
test has already been abandoned.
18 This book is mentioned in her bibliography.
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point the relationshipbetween themanydifferent interpretations of thepoten-
tial optative. Unfortunately, Construction Grammar assumes no difference
between semantic and pragmatic meaning in their classification of construc-
tions (Drummen 2013: 72–73). As a result, Drummen’s classification defines a
set of uses (much like the grammars before her) which mix semantics and
pragmatics, although admittedlywith specific linguistic characteristics per use.
She claims that the link between all uses are due to both form and meaning.
The formal part consists of the optative mood and the particle ἄν, even though
instances without ἄν occur in her corpus, as well as in Classical Greek in gen-
eral. The supposed meaning link is “epistemic possibility” since the potential
optative in all its related constructions expresses that it “is possible (according
to the speaker) that the state of affairs obtains” (Drummen 2013: 38; my ital-
ics). Besides theoretical objections to her approach already mentioned above,
I would like to discuss two problems in more detail, because they concern rel-
evant aspects of the potential optative that feature in the remainder of this
article. First of all, the attempt to identify her “epistemic possibility” as the
shared meaning across all constructions is not carried out consistently. On the
one hand, she also claims that the combination of the potential optative with
τάχα, ἴσως and που is harmonic (Drummen 2013: 77). As discussed above, these
elements, do not have the same strength and subjectivity, making them non-
harmonic.19 On the other hand, this explanation conflicts with her proposal for
the shared meaning of (subjective) epistemic possibility because she claims
that the epistemic value of the potential optative “has scope over the whole
proposition” (Drummen 2013: 74). As I argue below, proposition scope is a trait
which is confined to proper subjective epistemic modalities and is therefore
not a trait possessed by the non-subjective epistemicmodality of the potential
optative.
My secondpoint of disagreement relates toher claim that thepotential opta-
tive can have the epistemic possibility meaning with proposition scope at the
same time as a non-epistemic participant-oriented possibility meaning with
non-propositional scope.20 In my view, this is unattractive from a theoretical
19 The particle που, in my view, is not subjective but modifies an illocution, as suggested by
Allan (2015: 14).
20 Drummen (2013: 75; and in-depth at 80–89). ‘Participant-oriented possibilities’ is a term
she herself coined to encompass “inherent abilities (participant-internal abilities) as well
as circumstantial conditions (participant-external possibilities) enabling or disabling a
participant to engage in a state of affairs.” Note that Drummen here reworks the idea pro-
moted by Willmott (2007) for the Homeric Greek potential optative having a dynamic
modal meaning for Classical Greek (Drummen 2013: 70).
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point of view because two types of modality do not exist in one marker with
different scopes at the same usage time. Rather, I suggest that such participant-
oriented nuances are the result of contextual inference and not part of the
semantics of the optative, as becomes clear from the use of capacity verbs in
the optative (e.g., δυναίμην) instead of the indicative.21
To summarize, the lack of a clear distinction between the coded semantic
and pragmatic meaning of the potential optative exists throughout the liter-
ature. The conceptual assimilation of subjectivity with moods and modality
in our standard grammars has been taken over in recent literature, although
recent proposals in general linguistics (especially Narrog 2012: 23–45), which I
discuss in the next section, rightly reject this idea. The particles occurring with
the potential optative still have many insights to offer, since previous attempts
have in my view not been successful.
3 Epistemic modality versus subjectivity
In this section, I demonstrate why epistemic modality should be kept separate
from subjectivity. Epistemic modality is a semantic category which should be
defined as concerning “an indication of the estimation, typically, but not neces-
sarily, by the speaker, of the chances that the state of affairs expressed in the
clause applies in the world” (Nuyts 2006: 6, my italics).22 In other words, epis-
temic modality is applicable “when the degree of compatibility (or overlap)
between the modal world and the factual world is at stake” (Declerck 2011:33).
Linguistic subjectivity ought rather to be measured through a set of factors
with performativity as its primary quality. Performative expressions qualify “a
proposition with respect to the current speech situation (including speaker
and hearer)”, whereas non-qualifying expressions are seen as descriptive (Nar-
rog 2012: 42).23 Subjectivity cannot be associated in a strictly categorical fash-
ion with a specific word class (such as adverbs24), since linguistic items that
21 Ruiz Yamuza (2014: 456) discussed this idea as suggested byWillmott (2007) for Homeric
Greek and suggests this nuance is actually “context-based inference”.
22 See also Narrog 2012: 8. Both Nuyts (2006) and Narrog (2012) deliberately steer away from
the trap of defining epistemic modality solely in subjective epistemic terms, as do Bybee
et al. (1994: 179) and Allan (2013a: 4).
23 Narrog’s definition closely mirrors the formulation by its inventor, Nuyts (2001: 39) but
does not suggest an association with epistemic forms only. Also, it allows for a more
gradual view as a scale of performativity by not suggesting that performative expressions
always express full commitment by the speaker (as for example Nuyts 2002: 446).
24 For Ancient Greek adverbs, see Ruiz Yamuza (2006) and Dik (2014).
Downloaded from Brill.com10/12/2019 01:39:17PM
via free access
66 la roi
Journal of Greek Linguistics 19 (2019) 58–89
express a speaker’s subjective attitude toward the state of affairs belong to dif-
ferentword classes.25Moreover, the same linguistic itemcan express subjective
meanings aswell as non-subjectivemeanings depending on the context, aswit-
nessed by the possibility of a non-subjective deontic and a subjective epistemic
meaning formust.26
Besides the core notion of speaker-oriented commitment, subjectivity has
an important second dimension of evidence accessibility. That dimension con-
cerns the question of whether the expression “in a specific context expresses
a judgment which is based on evidence and/or values that are only accessi-
ble to the speaker” (Narrog 2012: 43). By contrast, the expression of a judgment
“based on evidence and/or values that are accessible or shared by a community
of speakers” is less subjective.27 In Classical Greek, for example, a statement
which is marked by inferential ἄρα indicates that the speaker bases the valid-
ity of his/her statement on his/her subjective inference (Allan 2017b). Finally,
the current approach to subjectivity asks for close examination of the context,
the place that can show us how a subjective statement relates to currently held
views and knowledge.
Distinguishing among different types of epistemic modality comes down
to the scope of the modal expression. In contrast to non-subjective epistemic
modalities, subjective epistemicmodalities have scopeover a proposition, such
as epistemic ‘must’ in the sentence John MUST have forgotten the meeting.28
Heremust expresses the speaker’s commitment to the idea that themodal and
factual world overlap, that is, that the state of affairs that John has forgotten
themeeting is the case.With a non-subjective epistemic modality such asmay
in He MAY have forgotten, the speaker’s commitment is absent, and may does
not have propositional scope as it is part of the state of affairs expressed. As
a result, speakers can make the conscious choice to add items with propo-
sitional scope to may, as in CERTAINLY, he MAY have forgotten. Components
with propositional scopemay be expressed not only by amodal expression but
25 See Narrog (2012: 31) and de Smet & Verstraete (2006).
26 Admittedly, there is a diachronic trend that more subjectivemeanings are themore gram-
maticalized ones, since grammaticalization and subjectification tend to go hand in hand.
For this phenomenon, see Allan (2013a) and the references cited there.
27 Narrog’s definition of this dimension is inspired by Nuyts’ frequent definitions of ‘subjec-
tivity’ as an evidential dimension (i.e., the degree to which the speaker is responsible for
the evidence of the assessment).
28 Several theories of grammar acknowledge a non-subjective type of epistemic modal-
ity, such as Functional Grammar by Dik (1997) and Functional Discourse Grammar by
Hengeveld &Mackenzie (2008), which have inspired this article. For an overview of func-
tional theories, see Butler (2003).
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also by subjective adverbs (τάχα and ἴσως) and particles (ἦ and ἄρα).29 In such
combinations, the expressionhas an identifiable non-subjective and subjective
component whose use is contextually determined. When a subjective epis-
temic modality occurs with ἦ or ἄρα, both are harmonic because they express
the samemodal strength. Consequently, they strengthen each other much like
He TRULY MUST be joking. However, when a non-subjectivemodality combines
with ἦ or ἄρα, they are non-harmonic, which makes the subjective particles
scope over themmuch like He CERTAINLY MAY have forgotten. This difference
becomes relevant to understanding the low frequency of combination of the
non-subjective potential optative with subjective particles.
4 Alternative approach to the semantics of the potential optative
As I now argue, the combinations of the Classical Greek potential optative
when combined with ἦ and/or ἄρα make up a complex combination in the
sameway thatmay and certainly do. The non-subjective epistemic character of
the potential optative is that it presents a judgement as interpersonally acces-
sible to the addressee(s), that is, epistemically shared between the speaker and
addressee(s).30 For this proposal, I adduce four types of support in the follow-
ing sections. First, I discuss the contextual semantics of the potential optative
in examples to clarify my proposal. Second, I show that the low frequency of
combination of the potential optative with the subjective particles supports
this proposal.Third, I apply linguistic tests for subjectivity to thepotential opta-
tive that point out that it is semantically non-subjective. Finally, an analysis of
contrastive contextswith andwithout ἦ and/or ἄρα demonstrates that ἦ and/or
ἄρα are added as a subjective component to the non-subjective potential opta-
tive for social or rhetorical reasons. Let us first consider some examples of the
potential optative on its own.
In the following example, Calonice presents her judgement as something
that everyone present knows is possible, since it concerns something that
29 The classification of the Ancient Greek particles by Allan 2015 distinguishes between
grammatical expressions (operators) such as modalities, tense or particles, and lexical
expressions such as adverbs (modifiers).
30 This conception of the epistemic value of the optative in Classical Greek has the benefit
of relating to the value of the optative in reported speech proposed in the literature. As
has been discussed by van Rooy (2016: 34–37) and several others before him, the opta-
tive in reported speech also marks lack of speaker commitment: “as far as it signals that
the speaker/narrator in the hic et nunc moment of speaking/narrating does not commit
himself to the information expressed by others or by himself in past contexts.”
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everybody knows on the basis of their general knowledge of the world. Thus,
the potential optative expresses that the conversational participants know that
it is possible that such a big wine jug makes merry, instead of Calonice stating
that she personally strongly believes that the wine jug will make merry.
(2) Myrrhine:
ὦ
VOC
φίλταται
dearest.NOM.PL
γυναῖκες,
ladies.NOM.PL
ὁ
the.NOM
κεραμεὼν
jug.NOM.SG
ὅσος.
what.Q
Calonice:
ταύτην
this.ACC
μὲν
PTC
ἄν
PTC
τις
someone.NOM
εὐθὺς
at.once
ἡσθείη
become.happy.OPT.AOR.3SG
λαβών.
touch.PTCP.AOR.NOM.SG
Myrrhine: Dearest ladies, what a jumbo jug!
Calonice: Just touching thiswouldmake a personmerry! (Ar. Lys. 200–
201)
Because the potential optative is used to present a judgment as epistemically
accessible to speaker and hearer, it shows a preference to occur in generalizing
statements which the hearers are presumed to be aware of. For example, of the
340 uses of indefinite τις in Aristophanes in main and subordinate clauses, 50
occurrences have the potential optative, whereas it combines with the future
indicative only 19 times to make indefinite future predictions. Similarly, in the
next example the optative in the question does not mark subjective commit-
ment to the state of affairs that women do something, but rather asks about
a presupposed possibility. Lysistrata in the preceding sentence made this pos-
sibility interpersonally accessible by saying that the women are able to save
Greece.
(3) Lysistrata:
κοινῇ
together
σώσομεν
rescue.1PL.FUT
τὴν
the.ACC
Ἑλλάδα.
Hellas.ACC.SG
Calonice:
τί
what.Q
δ’
PTC
ἂν
PTC
γυναῖκες
women.NOM.PL
φρόνιμον
prudent.ACC.SG
ἐργασαίατο
do.OPT.AOR.3SG
ἢ
or
λαμπρόν;
bright.ACC
αἳ
REL.NOM.PL
καθήμεθ’
sit.PRS.1PL
ἐξηνθισμέναι,
look.pretty.PTCP.PRS.NOM.PL
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κροκωτοφοροῦσαι
wear.saffron.PTCP.NOM.PL
καὶ
and
κεκαλλωπισμέναι
wear.make-up.PTCP.PRF.NOM.PL
καὶ
and
Κιμβερίκ’
Cimberic.ACC
ὀρθοστάδια
gown.ACC.PL.
καὶ
and
περιβαρίδας
pleasure-boat.slippers.ACC.PL
Lysistrata: together we’ll be able to rescue Greece!
Calonice: But whatwouldmere women do that’s intelligent or illustri-
ous?We sit around the house looking pretty, wearing saffron
dresses, and make-up, and Cimberic gowns, and pleasure-
boat slippers. (Ar. Lys. 41–45)
The non-subjective epistemic semantic characterization is alsomore attractive
for the use of the potential optative in emphatic refusals below, provided that
the semantic and the pragmatic force of the potential optative are kept sepa-
rate.
(4) Lysistrata:
ποιήσετ’
do.FUT.2PL
ἢ
or
οὐ
not
ποιήσετ’;
do.FUT.2PL
ἢ
or
τί
why.Q
μέλλετε;
delay.PRS.2PL
Calonice:
οὐκ
not
ἂν
PTC
ποιήσαιμ’,
do.OPT.AOR.1SG
ἀλλ’
but
ὁ
the.NOM
πόλεμος
war.NOM.SG
ἑρπέτω.
drag.on.IMP.3SG
Lysistrata Will you do it or not?What are you waiting for?
Calonice Count me out; let the war drag on (Ar. Lys. 127–129)
Later on in the play the women reject Lysistrata’s proposal to perform a sex
strike. The choice for the potential optative by Calonice is, in my view, made
in order to present the impossibility of Calonice’s participation more strongly,
that is, as unnegotiable. In my view, its semantic value should be paraphrased
as: ‘as you (and I) know, it is not possible that I would do that’. The reason
that the interlocutors know that especially Calonice would not be able to give
that up is that she has been complaining from line 102 onwards about how she
misses her husband and sexmore in general, since lovers have also abandoned
her.With this, the other women agreed. Thus, presenting something as seman-
tically impossible (as everybody knows) is rhetorically strong and contributes
to the strong pragmatic refusal value of the utterance as a whole here.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/12/2019 01:39:17PM
via free access
70 la roi
Journal of Greek Linguistics 19 (2019) 58–89
5 Frequency
The comparative frequency of ἦ and ἄρα with specific mood types also argues
against an explanation of the potential optative as subjective epistemic,
because the potential optative occursmarkedly less oftenwith these subjective
particles than other more subjective moods do. After all, if the potential opta-
tive actually were subjective epistemic, an affinity in combination with these
subjective particles would be expected. However, subjective uses of the future
in harmonic combinations with subjective particles are considerablymore fre-
quent than the non-harmonic combinations of the non-subjective potential
optative with subjective particles. To provide a diverse sample of the frequency
of combination, I measured the occurrence of the optative combinations in
different genres, in particular comedy (Aristophanes), tragedy (Euripides) and
philosophical dialogue (Plato).31
As shown in the table, the subjective particles in general strongly prefer to
occur with the indicative mood over the potential optative in every writer and
occur about twice as often with the future indicative in a subjective use. Also,
the data on the future indicative for the Platonic tests is even somewhat skewed
by the fact that the future indicative in Plato had acquired a further subjective
use (called “logical-inferential” byBakker 2002),whichmade combinationwith
these subjective particles less necessary.32
To underline the fact that combinations of the potential optative with the
subjective particles are quite a marked option, I compared the combinations
with ἦ and ἄρα to the frequency of non-combined potential optatives. In five
plays of Aristophanes the potential optative occurs 106 times in total, whereas
it combines with ἦ/ἄρα only once.33 Compared to an average of 1431.8 lines per
comedy,34 thepotential optative thus occurs rather sparingly, as non-combined
potential optatives occur in 1.48% of the lines in a play compared to 0.01% for
the combinationwith ἦ and ἄρα. Thismakes it highly unlikely that the potential
31 I distinguish between the non-future indicative and the future indicative because most
of the future indicative’s uses are inherently subjective, as when used with these parti-
cles (Allan 2017b: 51–57). The same preference applies to collocation with subjectively
used modal verbs, such as κινδυνεύω in Pl. Euthphr. 11d. Another reason to contrast the
frequency with the indicatives is that the particles occur only extremely rarely with the
subjunctive, that is, ἦ before a dubitative subjunctive or a subordinate clause and ἄρ(α) in
conditional or subordinate clauses with a subjunctive or with an adhortative subjunctive.
See, respectively, E. Or. 787, Pl. Ap. 37b, Pl. R. 389d, Hp. Ma. 239e and Tht. 205e.
32 See further Allan (2017b: 56–57).
33 Based on Ar. Ra., Lys., Ec., Av. and Pax.
34 This average is based on the following numbers: 1533+1321+1183+1357+1765=7159/5=1431,8.
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table 1 Collocation of ἦ and ἄραwith moodsa
Mood Aristophanes Euripides Plato Total
Potential optative+ ἄρα 3 2 79 83
Future indicative+ ἄρα 32 17 104 153
Non-future indicative+ ἄρα 91 86 544 721
Potential optative without ἦ/ ἄρα 662 – – –
Future indicative without ἦ/ ἄρα 1676 2112 3593 7586
Potential optative+ ἦ 2 8 17 27
Future indicative+ ἦ 13 19 18 50
Non-future indicative+ ἦ 41 73 81 195
a Texts transmitted as fragments and Plato’s spurious works are left out. Please note that the
number of total potential optatives was counted by hand, whereas the total of future indica-
tives without ἦ and ἄραwas calculated by subtracting the total of combinations of the future
indicative with ἦ and ἄρα from the total of future indicatives found in a Perseus search under
Philologic.
optativehas a subjective epistemic semantics. Rather, thenumbers suggest that
the potential optative has non-subjective epistemic semantics, which explains
its lack of affinity in combination with subjective particles such as ἦ and ἄρα.
6 Linguistic tests for subjectivity
Now I will apply tests for the subjectivity of modal markers to the potential
optative. The following formal and distributional properties of linguistic items
make a non-subjective (descriptive) reading of amarker of epistemicmodality
more likely:35
1. The possibility of past marking
2. The possibility of negation
3. The possibility of subjecting the modalized clause to interrogation
4. The possibility of using it in the protasis of conditionals
5. The scopal relationship in double modal marking
35 These tests come from Lyons (1977: 799) and Hengeveld (1988: 236–240) and are critically
discussed by Narrog (2012: 31–39). I rearranged their original order to the order of discus-
sion and left out the test of ‘questioning the source of the information’, which allegedly is
infelicitous with subjective modal markers because of the critiques mentioned in Narrog
(2012: 36).
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The first property points to the fact that past marking on the modal item
“removes the judgment deictically from the speaker’s present point of view,
since the time of the judgment is explicitly associated with a point in time dif-
ferent from the time of speech, and the past point of view does not necessarily
coincide with the present one”.36 The judgment in the following example thus
is not made about the current speech situation but it is more objectively made
in the past.
(5) Given that nobody had left the ship, the murderer still had to be around.
The Classical Greek optative lacks such a past temporal value. However, the
potential optative does have a linguistic association with the past in that it
is licensed after past indicatives in the main clause (Rijksbaron 2006: 51–54)
in many types of subordinate clauses, for example, of reported speech, indi-
rect questions or causal clauses.37 A suggestion that might be relevant from a
diachronic perspective is that the secondary endings of the optative imply epis-
temic distance (Allan 2013a: 41), which could perhaps point to the optative’s
descriptiveness.
In a similar way, immediate negation of a modal marker “indicates a dis-
tance between the judgment expressed in the modal marker, and the actual
speaker’s judgment at the time of speech” (Narrog 2012: 34).38 In other words, if
both tense and negation canmodify amodalmarker, it is likely that thismarker
has a higher degree of event orientation, meaning that the modal value marks
conditions on the event instead of the speaker’s evaluation of that event (Nar-
rog 2012: 34, 51). Lanski (2013) has convincingly shown that the negation with a
potential optative negates the potential value (as in the paraphrase of example
4) which therefore points to a higher level of descriptiveness for the potential
optative.
The third testing property is based on the fact that it is difficult to combine
questioning with a subjective assessment, as below:39
36 Narrog (2012: 32) gives example 5 and some additional examples from Japanese.
37 Relatedly, the optative in oblique sentences in Classical Greek can be marked by relative
tense by the future pointing to a more descriptive value for the optative mood. For the
future optative, see Martínez Vázquez (1995) and de la Villa (2017).
38 De Haan (2006: 52–56) notes that the negation criterion can be difficult to apply since
every language has widely different idiosyncratic rules for negation, and negation mark-
ers are sometimes selected for constructions without clear reasons via suppletion.
39 It is, however, not impossible, since we see ἦ and ἄρα in questions with the potential opta-
tive coding subjectivity.
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(6) A: Tommust have arrived.
B: *Must he?40
The insertion of a subjective modal item in a question canmake it lose its sub-
jective value and now reflects a non-subjective viewpoint, echoing the view-
point of speaker A.41 We know that the potential optative actually can be used
without limitations in questions.42
The fourth property states that the use in a conditional is denied to a sub-
jective marker, since it cannot present a performative assessment because the
conditional is functionally opposed to it as amarker of absence of commitment
(Verstraete 2004: 251). The use in a conditional would have somewhat infelici-
tously questioned a marker of commitment, as in the following example. The
subjective marker consequently becomes echoic:
(7) A: In my view Socrates must be the wisest man alive.
B: If hemust be the wisest man alive, why are they going to kill him then?
‘Must’ now echoes the subjective assessment by speaker A and cannot belong
to speaker B. The potential optative has no problem occurring in condition-
als and is probably more descriptive on the basis of this property, because it
is said that in conditionals it “presents the realization of the condition as just
possible and nomore than that” (Wakker 2013; Ruijgh 1971). To sum up, the first
four tests for subjectivity point out that the potential optative is not subjective
epistemic in value. As will become clear in the following sections, the fifth test
demonstrates the scope of ἦ/ἄρα over the non-subjective potential optative. In
other words, the test of double modal marking will demonstrate that the com-
binations of the potential optative with ἦ and ἄρα are non-harmonic, since the
potential optative of a non-subjective modal strength.
7 The combination with ἦ
I see ἦ as a strongly speaker-oriented particle expressing “a high degree of
speaker commitment”,43 marking “personal commitment of the speaker to the
40 Narrog (2012: 35).
41 For this echoing phenomenon, see Verstraete (2004: 249–250) and Narrog (2012: 35).
42 Cf. Rijksbaron (2006: 5–9) and e.g., E. Ba. 945.
43 Although I do agree with Bonifazi et al. (2016: 3.2.2) that the particle ἦ involves speaker
involvement, I would not say that its core value ἦ is expressive, but rather epistemic.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/12/2019 01:39:17PM
via free access
74 la roi
Journal of Greek Linguistics 19 (2019) 58–89
validity of the utterance”.44 In Allan’s classification, this particle in my view
rightly belongs to the layer of propositional content on the semantic (repre-
sentational) level. Evidence for this classification is that it scopes under ques-
tions, whereas (interactional) particles on the pragmatic (interpersonal) level
do not.45 I argue that the particle is added to the potential optative when a
speaker wants to mark his/her commitment to an accessible possibility for
rhetorical or social reasons, as in the following example:
(8) Strepsiades:
σάλπιγξ
bugle.NOM.SG
ὁ
the.NOM
πρωκτός
anus.NOM.SG
ἐστιν
to.be.PRS.3SG
ἄρα
PTC
τῶν
the.GEN.PL
ἐμπίδων.
gnat.GEN.PL
ὢ
VOC
τρισμακάριος
thrice.blessed.VOC
τοῦ
the.GEN.SG
διεντερεύματος.
acuteness.GEN.SG
ἦ
PTC
ῥᾳδίως
easily
φεύγων
escape.PTCP.PRS.NOM.SG
ἀποφύγοι
escape.OPT.AOR.3SG
δίκην,
conviction.ACC
ὅστις
rel.NOM.SG
δίοιδε
know.PRF.3SG
τοὔντερον
the.inside.ACC
τῆς
the.GEN.SG
ἐμπίδος.
gnat.GEN.SG
Strepsiades: So the gnat’s arsehole turns out to be a bugle. Thrice happy
man, for such penetrating enterology! As a defendant he’d
certainly escape conviction, since he knows the gnat’s gut
inside out.46 (Ar. Nu. 165–168)
Strepsiades uses the combination to acknowledge his personal commitment
(ἦ) to the contextually given possibility that Socrates would escape conviction
(ἀποφύγοι). The explanation for his stance-taking lies in the previous context.
After his advice to his son to go to the thinking-shop (φροντιστήριον), he decided
that he alsowanted to acquire some knowledge himself. The first thing that the
44 Cuypers (2005: 50) and Denniston (1954: 279–288). This view diverges slightly from the
one presented by Sicking & Van Ophuijsen (1993) andWakker (1997: 213), who define the
particle in opposition to μήν. For μήν, I agree instead with Thijs (2017).
45 Cf. Wakker (1997: 218–223). And see Allan (2015: 8) for an example.
46 Here I changed the translation with ‘he’d certainly be able to’ to ‘he’d certainly’ because, as
I mentioned, I do not want to create the impression that I think that the Classical Greek
potential optative has a (non-epistemic) dynamic modal meaning, contrary to Drummen
(2013: 80–89), in that it would express a participant’s capacity. Rather, the potential opta-
tive only has an epistemic semantics.
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pupil in the thinking-shop shares with him is some secret knowledge received
from Socrates who used wax to measure how many feet gnats use to jump
fromoneplace to another after biting someone. Importantly, the pupil qualifies
Socrates’ solution as very clever (δεξιώτατα, l. 148) and Strepsiades completely
agrees praising Socrates’ subtlety of thought (ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ τῆς λεπτότητος τῶν
φρενῶν, l. 153). This way, Socrates’ cleverness is made accessible to the con-
versational participants.47 When the pupil thereafter speaks of another clever
solution by Socrates, Strepsiades reacts, in line with his previous admiration of
the nonsense knowledge that he had been given, by saying that that knowledge
is the knowledge to have if one wants to escape conviction (see the following
relative clause). Thus, Strepsiades personally believes (ἦ) that Socrates’ escape
may be assumed by the addressee as possible.
The particle ἦ occurs nearly as often in declarative sentences as in inter-
rogative sentences. In questions, ἦ is used by speakers to subjectively commit
oneself48 to a possibility that is already interpersonally given but about which
the speaker suggestively asks if the addressee thinks that this commitment is
right. After cornering Socrates and Glaucon at the start of the Republic, Pole-
marchus threatens them that they can only leave if they outdo them.
(9) Οὐκοῦν,
PTC
ἦν
to.say.IMPF.1SG
δ’
PTC
ἐγώ,
I
ἔτι
still
ἓν
one.NOM
λείπεται,
remain.PRS.3SG
τὸ
the.NOM.SG
ἢν
if
πείσωμεν
persuade.SUBJ.AOR.1PL
ὑμᾶς
you.ACC
ὡς
that
χρὴ
should.PRS.3SG
ἡμᾶς
we.ACC
ἀφεῖναι;
let.go.INF.AOR
Ἦ
PTC
καὶ
and
δύναισθ’
be.able.OPT.PRS.2PL
ἄν,
PTC
ἦ
say.IMPF.3SG
δ’
PTC
ὅς,
he.NOM
πεῖσαι
persuade.INF.AOR
μὴ
not
ἀκούοντας;
listen.PTCP.PRS.ACC.PL
Οὐδαμῶς,
Certainly.not
ἔφη
say.IMPF.3SG
ὁ
the.NOM
Γλαύκων.
Glaucon
47 It is well conceivable that Socrates’ cleverness was proverbial, communally shared knowl-
edge, but for the sake of explanation I leave this matter aside.
48 Following Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 71), I also distinguish a propositional layer in
interrogative sentences.
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Polymarchus: ‘Yes, but don’t we still have the alternative,’ I said, ‘to see
if we can persuade you to let us go?’
‘Would you really have any success,’ he said, ‘in persuad-
ing those who don’t listen?’
‘No, we certainly wouldn’t,’ said Glaucon. (Pl. R. 327c)
The alternative that Socrates tries to offer is thrown off the table by what Pole-
marchus’ statement with the optative combination implies. The question with
the optative asks about the interpersonally accessible knowledge that people
whodonot listen cannot bepersuaded,which counters Socrates’ hope that per-
suading them would free him and Glaucon. The subjective particle ἦ is what
makes the question persuasive. The full contextual value of the question could
be paraphrased hierarchically as ‘I ask (interrogative sentence type) whether I
may really (ἦ) think that you would have any success (potential optative)’. Thus,
the subjectivity of ἦ concerns the given possibility that Socrates and Glaucon
would have a way out of their captivity.
Let us next consider contrastive contexts with and without ἦ. In his quest to
revenge his father’s death, Orestes investigates, whilst unrecognized by Electra,
whether she is willing to kill her mother. Therefore he asked her how Orestes
would kill his father’s killers if he came home (in line 274). Importantly, the
‘how’ question presupposes that he would, showing that both are aware of the
possibility that Orestes would kill his father’s killers.
(10) Orestes:
ἐλθὼν
come.PTCP.AOR.NOM.SG
δὲ
PTC
δὴ
PTC
πῶς
how.Q
φονέας
murderers.ACC.PL
ἂν
PTC
κτάνοι
kill.OPT.AOR.3SG
πατρός;
father.GEN.SG
Electra:
τολμῶν
dare.PTCP.PRS.NOM.SG
ὑπ’
by
ἐχθρῶν
enemies.GEN.PL
οἷ’
what
ἐτολμήθη
endure.AOR.3SG
†πατήρ†.
father.NOM.SG
Orestes:
ἦ
PTC
καὶ
also
μετ’
with
αὐτοῦ
he.GEN.SG
μητέρ’
mother.ACC.SG
ἂν
PTC
τλαίης
dare.OPT.AOR.2SG
κτανεῖν;
Kill.INF
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Electra:
ταὐτῶι
the.same.DAT.SG
γε
PTC
πελέκει
axe.DAT.SG
τῶι
the.DAT
πατὴρ
father.NOM.SG
ἀπώλετο.
die.3SG.AOR
Orestes: But if he does come, howwould he kill his father’s murderers?
Electra: By showing the same boldness his enemies once showed.
Orestes: Surely would you also have the hardihood to kill your mother
with his help?
Electra: Yes, with the same ax with which my father met his death! (E.
El. 274–277)
The subsequent potential optative enquires about Electra’s tolerance of the
presupposed possibility that Orestes would kill their father’s killers when he
comes (ἐλθὼν δὲ δὴ). By contrast, Orestes in this question specifies his subjec-
tive belief (with ἦ) that Electra would also have the strength to kill her father’s
murderers, a given possibility because of her previous expressions of hatred
against the killers of her father. This subtle rhetorical difference in subjectiv-
ity in turn draws out a commitment formulation by Electra in the next sen-
tence.
Also in a contrastive context with examples slightly further apart from one
another, the subtle difference in subjectivity becomes clear from the use. In
example 11, Socrates has just responded to Phaedrus’ promise to recount his
thought-provoking meeting with the writer Lysias by asking a rhetorical ques-
tion, a question which implied that hearing the conversation was most impor-
tant.
(11) Phaedrus:
πρόαγε
lead.on.IMP.2SG
δή.
PTC
Socrates:
λέγοις
speak.OPT.PRS.2SG
ἄν.
PTC
Phaedrus:
Καὶ
PTC
μήν
PTC
ὦ
voc
Σώκρατες,
Socrates
προσήκουσά
be.fitting.PTCP.PRS.NOM
γέ
PTC
σοι
you.DAT.SG
ἡ
the.NOM.SG
ἀκοή.
hearing.NOM.SG
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Socrates:
ὢ
VOC
γενναῖος.
noble.VOC
εἴθε
PTC
γράψειεν
write.OPT.AOR.3SG
ὡς
that
χρὴ
should.PRS.3SG
πένητι
the.poor.DAT.SG
μᾶλλον
rather
ἢ
than
πλουσίῳ,
the.rich.DAT.SG
καὶ
and
πρεσβυτέρῳ
the.old.DAT.SG
ἢ
than
νεωτέρῳ,
the.young.DAT.SG
καὶ
and
ὅσα
what.Q
ἄλλα
but
ἐμοί
me.DAT.SG
τε
PTC
πρόσεστι
belong.PRS.3SG
καὶ
and
τοῖς
the.DAT.PL
πολλοῖς
most.DAT.Pl
ἡμῶν:
we.GEN.PL
ἦ
PTC
γὰρ
PTC
ἂν
PTC
ἀστεῖοι
witty.NOM.PL
καὶ
and
δημωφελεῖς
of.general.utility.NOM.PL
εἶεν
to.be.OPT.3PL
οἱ
the.NOM.PL
λόγοι.
discourse.NOM.PL.
Phaedrus: Lead on, then.
Socrates: Speak.
Phaedrus: Indeed, Socrates, you are just the man to hear it …
Socrates: O noble Lysias! I wish he will write that they should be
granted to the poor rather than to the rich, to the old rather
than to the young, and so of all the other qualities that I and
most of us have; for truly his discoursewould bewitty and of
general utility. (P. Phdr. 227c)
Phaedrus suggests that Socrates “lead on” the conversation, but Socrates
repeats that he wants Phaedrus to speak, by using the optative for a mild order
(Rijksbaron 2006: 42). However, the semantics of the potential optative remain
epistemic, more specifically, non-subjective epistemic. The optative signifies
the conversationally given possibility that Phaedrus would speak. Its semantic
value may be paraphrased as ‘as you and I know, it is possible that you speak’,
which contextually receives the pragmatic implicature of amild request. Phae-
drus completely agrees and says that Socrates is just theman to hear it, because
Lysias had written a speech on the theme of love, which said that favours
shouldbe granted to theonewho is not in love. Socrates, however, subsequently
expresses his wish that Lysias will say that the favours should be granted to the
poor or the old, since those are qualities that Socrates himself and most of the
people possess. He supports this wish by saying that Lysias’ discourse would
then truly be witty and of general utility. The non-subjective epistemic seman-
tics of the optative combination is clear from the previous context. It is general
knowledge to Phaedrus and Socrates that the application of Lysias’ logic to the
challenged persons in the world would be useful and, as witnessed by his pre-
ceding wish, Socrates subjectively marks his belief in that usefulness.
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8 The combination with ἄρα (and ἦ)
The Classical Greek particle ἄρα has two semantically close components—an
evidential and a mirative component—of which either one may be present
or both at the same time.49 On the one hand, the particle can express infer-
ential evidentiality, meaning that the speaker’s source of information for a
statement is inference. This means that the validity of the statement relies on
the speaker’s subjective deduction from perceptible evidence, earlier experi-
ences or (logical) reasoning. On the other hand, ἄρα can signify the speaker’s
subjective surprise at the new or remarkable information which s/he has been
presented with. Both subjective values share that they typically concern hind-
sight evaluation, which canmake it difficult to determine whether an example
only contains one of the semantic elements or both.
Besides semantic grounds for the propositional scope of ἄρα, there is amore
formal argument that supports this classification: the particle scopes under
questions (as ἦ does).50
(12) Chremes:
πλεῖστος
the.greatest.NOM.SG
ἀνθρώπων
people.GEN.PL
ὄχλος,
crowd.NOM.SG
ὅσος
REL.NOM.SG
οὐδεπώποτ’
never
ἦλθ’
come.IMPF.3SG
ἁθρόος
together.NOM.SG
ἐς
to
τὴν
the.ACC
πύκνα.
Pnyx.ACC.SG
(…) οὐ
not
γὰρ
PTC
ἀλλ’
PTC
ὑπερφυῶς
strangely
ὡς
PTC
λευκοπληθὴς
pale-faced.NOM.SG
ἦν
to.be.IMPF.3SG
ἰδεῖν
to.see.INF
ἡκκλησία.
Assembly.NOM.SG
ὥστ’
so.that
οὐκ
not
ἔλαβον
get.AOR.1SG
οὔτ’
nor
αὐτὸς
self.NOM.SG
οὔτ’
nor
ἄλλοι
other.NOM.PL
συχνοί.
many.NOM.PL
Blepyrus:
οὐδ’
neither
ἄρ’
PTC
ἂν
PTC
ἐγὼ
I
λάβοιμι
get.OPT.AOR.1SG
νῦν
now
ἐλθών;
go.PTCP.AOR.GEN.PL
49 I follow the definition by Allan (2015: 9) instead of Van Rooy (2016: 12–14) since Allan’s
treatment is more extensive, proposes a clearer connection between the two values and
does not add what is in my view an unwarranted mitigating function.
50 Oddly enough, Allan 2015 only discusses this scope relation for ἦ and not ἄρα. He does pay
attention to the question particle ἆρα.
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Chremes: A huge crowd of people showed up en masse at the Pnyx,
an all-time record. (…) Really, the Assembly was awfully pale
faced to behold. So I didn’t get anything, and a bunch of oth-
ers didn’t either.
Blepyrus: So if I went there now I therefore wouldn’t get anything
either? (Ar. Ec. 383–387)
As with ἦ, the scope relations of this question can be paraphrased as ‘I ask if
(interrogative sentence type) whether it therefore (ἄρα) is the case that, if I
went there now, I would not get (potential optative) anything either’. ‘There-
fore’ here signifies the subjective inference of ἄρα, which Blepyrus draws from
the information that Chremes gave him; that is, that the Assembly is in such a
poor state that no one got anything, though people normally do get hand-outs
there. Blepyrus infers that it is also pointless for him to go there. As with ἦ, the
subjective assessment scopes over the interpersonally accessible possibility of
getting something at the Assembly as usual.
An example of ἄρα with a mirative value is in example 13, where woman B’s
reaction to the proposal to grab some seats in front of the chairman causes dis-
pute.
(13) Woman B:
ταυτί
this.ACC
γέ
PTC
τοι
PTC
νὴ
PTC
τὸν
the.ACC
Δί’
Zeus.ACC
ἐφερόμην,
bring.IMPF.1SG
ἵνα
in.order.to
πληρουμένης
fill.up.PTCP.PRS.GEN.SG
ξαίνοιμι
knit.OPT.PRS.1SG
τῆς
the.GEN
ἐκκλησίας.
Assembly.GEN.SG
Praxagoras:
πληρουμένης
fill.up.PTCP.PRS.GEN.SG
τάλαινα;
stupid.NOM.SG
Woman B:
νὴ
PTC
τὴν
the.ACC
Ἄρτεμιν
Artemis.ACC
ἔγωγε.
I=PTC
τί
Why.Q
γὰρ
PTC
ἂν
PTC
χεῖρον
worse
ἀκροῴμην
hearken.OPT.PRS.1SG
ἄρα51
PTC
ξαίνουσα;
knit.PTCP.PRS.NOM.SG
γυμνὰ
naked.NOM.PL
δ’
PTC
51 Asmy analysis shows, I do not believe that it is warranted to correct ἄρα to ἅμα as themost
recent OCT byWilson (2007) does followingDobree’s conjecture (1833:232). The argument
for this is threefold: the codiceshaveἄρα, its value fits this situationandἄρα actually occurs
twicemore often in a late position in an interrogative sentence inWilson’s text edition (Ar.
Ec. 460, 668).
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ἐστί
to.be.PRS.3SG
μου
me.GEN
τὰ
the.NOM
παιδία
children.NOM.PL
Woman B: (producing a knitting basket) That’s exactly why I brought
this along, to get some knitting done while the Assembly’s
filling up.
Praxagoras: Filling up, stupid?
Woman B: Sure, by Artemis.Won’t I be able to listen just as well while
I knit? And my kids have nothing to wear. (Ar. Ec. 86–92)
Praxagoras had instructed the women to go as man-like as they can to the
Assembly, providing them, for example, with beards to let them go unnoticed.
When woman B stupidly says that she brought a knitting basket to kill time
whenwaiting for theAssembly tobe filled, Praxagoras getsmad. Ignorant as she
is,WomanB reactswith surprise at Praxagoras’s reactionwho supposes that she
would be able to listen whilst also knitting. Thus, we can understand that the
particle here marks the speaker’s subjective surprise about the assumed given
possibility that she cannot listen whilst knitting.
The non-subjectivity of the potential optative in line 90 becomes even
clearer from the contrast to its occurrence without ἄρα in line 96 in Praxagora’s
response toWoman B.
(14) ἰδού
See.IMP.2SG
γέ
PTC
σε
you.ACC
ξαίνουσαν,
knit.PTCP.PRS.ACC.SG
ἣν
REL.ACC.SG
τοῦ
the.GEN
σώματος
body.GEN.SG
οὐδὲν
nothing.ACC.SG
παραφῆναι
show.INF.PRS
τοῖς
the.DAT
καθημένοις
sit.PTCP.PRS.DAT.PL
ἔδει.
ought.to.IMPF.3SG
οὐκοῦν
PTC
καλά
nice.ACC.PL
γ’
PTC
ἂν
PTC
πάθοιμεν,
receive.OPT.AOR.1PL
εἰ
if
πλήρης
full.NOM.SG
τύχοι
happen.OPT.AOR.3SG
ὁ
the.NOM
δῆμος
citizenry.NOM.SG
ὢν
to.be.PTCP.PRS.NOM
κἄπειθ’
and=thereafter
ὑπερβαίνουσά
climb.over.PTCP.PRS.NOM.SG
τις
someone.NOM
ἀναβαλλομένη
hitch.up.PTCP.PRS.NOM.SG
δείξειε
show.OPT.AOR.3SG
τὸν
the.ACC
Φορμίσιον.
Phormisius.ACC.SG
Listen to you: knitting! When you shouldn’t be showing any part of your
body to the men. Wouldn’t we be in a fine fix if the citizenry’s all there
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and then some woman has to climb over them, hitching up her clothes
and flashing her Phormisius! (Ar. Ec. 93–97)
Here Praxagoras uses the potential optative for a witty remark which the par-
ticipants will understand, since they are caught up in a plan to hide their fem-
ininity.
Another indication of the epistemic accessibility of the potential optative is
its occurrence in confirmatory answers.
(15) Socrates:
οὕτως,
This.way
ὡς
that
μέγιστον
biggest.NOM.SG
τῶν
the.GEN
κακῶν
evil.GEN.PL
τυγχάνει
to.be.the.case.PRS.3SG
ὂν
to.be.PTCP.PRS.NOM.SG
τὸ
the.NOM.SG
ἀδικεῖν.
do.wrong.INF.PRS
Polus:
ἦ
PTC
γὰρ
PTC
τοῦτο
this.NOM
μέγιστον;
biggest.NOM.SG
οὐ
not
τὸ
the.NOM
ἀδικεῖσθαι
suffer.wrong.INF.PRS
μεῖζον;
greater.NOM.SG
Socrates:
ἥκιστά
not.in.the.least.
γε.
PTC
Polus:
σὺ
you.2SG
ἄρα
PTC
βούλοιο
want.OPT.PRS.2SG
ἂν
PTC
ἀδικεῖσθαι
suffer.wrong.INF.PRS
μᾶλλον
rather
ἢ
than
ἀδικεῖν;
do.evil.INF.PRS
Socrates:
βουλοίμην
want.OPT.PRS.1SG
μὲν
PTC
ἂν
PTC
ἔγωγε
I=PTC
οὐδέτερα
neither.ACC.PL
Socrates: In this, that to do wrong is the greatest of evils.
Polus: What, is this the greatest? Is not to suffer wrong a greater?
Socrates: By no means.
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Polus: Then would you wish rather to suffer wrong than to do it?
Socrates: I would wish neither, for my own part. (P. Grg 469b-c)
When Polus questions Socrates’ claim that doing evil is the greatest of evils,
making committers of doing evil both pitiable and wretched, Polus infers from
Socrates’ stance that he would thus rather be the object of wrongdoing than
the performer of it. Importantly, the possibility that he would want that is
already accessible in the previous answers, but ἄρα marks that Polus subjec-
tively applies the situation to Socrates.52 Socrates confirms that Polus is right
to assume from theprevious conversation that hewould prefer it in that he uses
the potential optative as well.
A final example that deserves treatment is the extremely rare combinationof
the potential optative with both ἄρα and ἦ. The rarity of this combinationmust
stem from the fact that the non-subjective epistemic optative is combinedwith
two subjective particles. As a result, there is a clear contextual motivation for
the use of this marked option.
(16) τόλμα
bear.up.
δ’
PTC
ἐρῶσα·
love.PTCP.PRS.NOM.SG.
θεὸς
god.NOM.SG.
ἐβουλήθη
want.AOR.3SG
τάδε·
this.ACC
νοσοῦσα
be.ill.PTCP.PRS.NOM.SG
δ’
PTC
εὖ
well
πως
somehow
τὴν
this.ACC
νόσον
illness.ACC.SG
καταστρέφου.
subdue.IMP.2SG
εἰσὶν
to.be.PRS.3PL
δ’
PTC
ἐπωιδαὶ
incantations.NOM.PL
καὶ
and
λόγοι
words.NOM.PL
θελκτήριοι·
enchanting.NOM.PL
φανήσεταί
turn.up.FUT.3SG
τι
some.NOM.SG
τῆσδε
the.GEN
φάρμακον
cure.ACC.SG
νόσου.
disease.GEN.SG
ἦ
PTC
τἄρ’
PTC
ἂν
PTC
ὀψέ
soon
γ’
PTC
ἄνδρες
men.NOM.PL
ἐξεύροιεν
invent.OPT.PRS.3PL
ἄν,
PTC
εἰ
if
μὴ
not
γυναῖκες
women.NOM.PL
μηχανὰς
contrivances.ACC.PL
εὑρήσομεν.
discover.FUT.1PL
Bear up under your love: it was a god that willed it. And if you are ill with
it, use some goodmeasures to subdue your illness. There are incantations,
andwords that charm: somethingwill turn up to cure this love.Men truly
wouldbe slow to invent such contrivances if wewomendonot find them.
(E. Hipp. 476–481)
52 I believe that the interpersonal accessibility of the epistemic statement is what distin-
guishes the potential optative with evidential ἄρα from its use with the future indicative,
which presents new and insufficiently accessible knowledge.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/12/2019 01:39:17PM
via free access
84 la roi
Journal of Greek Linguistics 19 (2019) 58–89
These lines round off a contemplative speech by the nurse on the dread-
ful ways of Cypris, advising Phaedra to just aim for the best that one is able
to achieve. More importantly, she offers practical advice by stating that there
will definitely be some kind of charm to help her. The subsequent statement
with the potential optative relies on the well-known belief in Classical Greek
times that women are the more mischievous sex and therefore more capable
of finding the type of curesmentioned thanmen.53 The subjective particle ἦ in
my view marks that the nurse also personally believes that men will be slower
in finding such a cure, an opinion partly voiced in the preceding lines and in
the use of the future indicative. The following mix of τοι and ἄρα (=τἄρ’),54 on
the one hand, mark that the validity of the statement partly relies on personal
experience from which the nurse infers (ἄρα) that men won’t be able to be as
resourceful as women, while, on the other hand, asking for attention to a piece
of knowledge that is of interest to Phaedra (τοι). The whole combination of the
particles and the mood thus work together to make clear to Phaedra that she
can solve her problems herself without the nurse being too explicit onwhether
she needs to resort to malicious means. The generalizing nature of this state-
ment thereby fits the ambiguity of the nurse’s suggestions to Phaedra to take
matters in her own hands.
9 Conclusion
In this paper I have challenged the commonly held view that the Classical
Greek potential optative has a subjective epistemic semantics by, among other
things, taking into account the interaction with the subjective particles ἦ and
ἄρα. I have argued in several ways why a non-subjective epistemic semantics
for the potential optative is more attractive. First, I have shown that the poten-
tial optative’s lower frequency of combination with the subjective particles ἦ
and ἄρα point to a lack of affinity in (non-harmonic) combination, something
which contradicts the allegedly subjective epistemic semantics for the poten-
tial optative. Second, I have demonstrated how a non-subjective approach to
epistemicmodality doesmore justice to thedifferent kinds of epistemicmodal-
ity available, in particular that of the semantics of the potential optative. This
approach allows for discrimination between subjective epistemic modalities
with proposition scope such as subjectively used modal verbs or subjective
53 See Barret (1964: 247) and, for example, E. IT. 1032.
54 See Allan (2015: 12–14).
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uses of the future indicative and non-subjective epistemic modalities without
proposition scope such as the Classical Greek potential optative. As a result,
I have been able to explain the interaction of particles with the meaning of a
mood, that is, how ἦ and ἄρα specify a subjective semantic component in non-
harmonic combinations with the non-subjective potential optative, added for
social or rhetorical reasons to specify the speaker’s personal stance. Finally, I
have stressed the methodological importance of examining contrastive con-
texts to solidify my proposal. Especially the accurate examination of these
contrastive examples and their contexts has enabled me to show the current
non-subjective epistemic proposal is more satisfactory.
The results of this article provide several new research opportunities. First
and foremost, I hope that the innovative contribution of this paper to the study
of the interaction of particles, modality and mood will be a starting point
for so-called “mood alternation” in Ancient Greek texts.55 As with tense and
aspect alternation, the consecutive choice of mood by speakers ought to be
investigated systematically. As we have seen with the potential optative, this
alternation depends both on what is epistemically accessible to the conver-
sational participants and on a speaker’s interactive goals. An exciting starting
point would be analysing the alternation between the future indicative and the
potential optative with and without particles. Also, I expect that an essential
analytic tool to explain the alternation of subjectively versus non-subjectively
used moods will be the notion of Common Ground (Clark 1996). This notion
has so far only been applied to adversative particles in Ancient Greek,56 but
should in my view be applied to epistemic modality as well, because speakers
adapt their mood use to what is already known by the addressee. Second, it
would be rewarding to relate the non-subjective value of the potential opta-
tive in the main clause to other uses of the optative. For example, the wish
optative also occasionally occurs with ἦ and ἄρα which could suggest that it
has a non-subjective epistemics as well (la Roi forthc.). Finally, the particles
withpragmatic values57 suchas the information structural particlesγ(ε), δή and
δῆτ(α) or the illocutionary particles μήν and που perhaps influence the prag-
matic values of the potential optative in a different way, but those questions
have not been dealt with yet.
55 For further references, see Jary (2009).
56 See Thijs (2017), Allan (2017a) and Allan & van Gils forthc. However, see la Roi forthc. for
an application of Common Ground theory to the wish optative and its particles.
57 See the classification by Allan (2015).
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